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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF T·HE E·S-
TATE OF FRED W. HARPER, 
Deceased. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF· F·ACTS 
Case No. 
8049 
On January 21, 1954, this Court rendered an opin-
Ion and judgment granting appellant a reversal of a 
decree of the trial court holding that certain real prop-
erty vested in respondent as survivor of a joint ten-
ancy. Respondent hereby respectfully applies for a 
rehearing upon the grounds hereinafter set forth. 
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J:>OIN'I'S. REI~IED ON 
Thi~ Court erred: 
1. In failing to recognize that in all divorce actions 
111 Uti~ Htate, the court's statutory power to dispose of 
propPrty is a 1nere incident to the court's authority to 
disHolv(• the bonds of matrimony. 
2. In holding that the order setting aside the inter-
loeutory decrees was void. 
3. In holding that the death of the plaintiff did 
not u1ake a nullity of the interlocutory decree in its 
entirety. 
4. In holding that death of one of the spouses 
during the interlocutory period terminated the personal 
relationship and abated the action insofar as the mar-
ital relationship was concerned but that such death did 
not abate the action insofar as property rights were 
determined by the decree; this in the absence of a 
property settlement agree1nent, a contract for, or, a 
present conveyance of property affected between the 
parties to the divorce action. 
5. In holding that the interlocutory decree of di-
vorce where property rights were incidentally deter-
mined remained effective and became final in the san1e 
manner and at the same time as a decree bet,veen living 
persons; this in the absence of a property settlement 
agreement, a contract for, or, a present conveyance of 
property affected between the parties to the divorce 
action. 
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6. In holding that the death of one of the spouses 
during the interlocutory period 'vas not sufficient cause 
for the lo,ver court to vacate the interlocutory decree 
of divorce. 
7. In holding that any party other than the plain-
tiff or the defendant in the divorce action was, or could 
be, entitled to notice of a motion to vacate the inter-
locutory decree. 
8. In holding that upon the death of Fred W. Har-
per, during the interlocutory period, title to property 
held by him in joint tenancy with his surviving spouse, 
Zilpha Harper, vested in his heirs or devisees. 
9. In holding that the heirs or devisees of Fred 
W. Harper were entitled to notice of the motion of 
Zilpha Harper, the surviving spouse, made to set aside 
the interlocutory decree and to- dismiss the divorce 
action. 
10. In holding that the lower court's order to va-
cate the interlocutory decree was subject to collateral 
attack. 
11. In reversing the judgment of the lower court 
and ordering the case remanded with directions to dis-
miss the petition without prejudice and allow the parties 
to be heard upon the merits in the divorce action should 
they so desire. 
In addition to the errors hereinabove set forth, the 
Court speaking through Honorable David T. Le,vis, 
Judge, enunciated certain propositions of law which we 
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I'P~fH'<~tfully submit are of grave concern to the mem-
hPT8 of the bar, the courts of this State and the litigants 
tht• .. eiu. We dirP('t the Court's attention to the following 
pronouB<'PllH·nts of the op1n1on. 
(a) It is stated: 
• . • • All the property rights granted Fred W. 
llarpPr by the divorce decree vested, upon his 
<h~ath, in his heirs or devisees, subject to the stat-
utory liutitations of the decree itself and applic-
able probate procedures. 
;\ nd thereafter: 
The death of a party before the decree be-
ronles absolute 1nay under so1ne eireumstances be 
sufficient cause to vacate the decree in its en-
tirety. Other factors, such as the welfare of minor 
ehildren, 1nay in some instances warrant a dif-
. ferent disposition of property. 
Thus, the opinion has the effect of holding that 
in an action for divorce, title to real property 1nay vest 
or be not vested, dependent upon the circumstances 
peculiarly attendant, not only to the parties but to 
their heirs or devisees. 
(b) Further, the opinion states: 
* * * When the death of one of the parties occurs 
after the entry of a divorce decree and before the 
decree is final the decree becon1es ineffective to 
dissolve the marriage, death having terminated 
that personal relationship * * *. 
Thus, it is held, or the effect of the holding is, that 
the surviving spouse is the widow of the deceased hus-
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band for all purposes except "There there is an inter-
locutory decree of divorce wherein property has been 
a-\varded the husband W'ho happens to die before the 
decree becon1es effective to dissolve the marital rela-
tionship. 
(c) Also: 
The reasoning of the Rasmussen case is ap-
plicable to the instant case. 
vV e respectfully suggest to the Court that this con-
clusion is erroneous. In that case, it is to be remem-
bered, the infor1nation upon "\Vhich the trial court appar-
ently acted 'vas ex parte, and was in no way related to 
o1· connected with the action for d.ivorce. 
(d) Finally, the opinion holds: 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Com1nission, 
82 Utah 179, 22 P.2d 1046, and In Re Johnson's 
Estate, supra, both of 'vhich interpret the statu-
tory provisions herein considered, neither the 
1natter of notice nor the disposition of property 
\Vas directly considered or discussed. However, 
to the extent the decisions in those cases indicate 
approval of ex parte orders as the basis for vacat-
ing divorce decrees affecting property rights we 
expressly overrule the holdings. 
We submit that the decisions in both cases are, 
based upon the factual situations presented, legally 
sound and that neither decision should by reason of the 
problem presented here be disturbed. In Salt Lake City 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, both of the parties to 
the divorce action moved, during their lifetime, to set 
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a~idP tht~ intPrlocutory decree. So far as we are here 
<'ollt'PI'HPd th(~ holding in that case merely reiterates the 
rule that an interlocutory decree of divorce rnay be 
P rnventt~d frOlll h<~eotning absolute and its finality post-
ponPd l1y tl1P filing of a rnotion to vacate the findings 
of fa<·t anu dPeree as was previously decided in Spen-
l't'r r. ()lark, 54 Utah R3, 179 P. 741. In Re Joh!nsons 
/f,'sfall', S-t. l 'tah lfiH, 35 P.2d 305, affirms also the hold-
ing- in ~-~'Ju~nl'er 1.:. ()lark, supra, and stands squarely 
for the propo:-:ition that the death of a party during the 
interl<H'Utory decree is sufficient ground for vacating 
the deerPe of the divorce, as no final judgment could 
he entered against a deceased person and no one could 
be snbstituted for a deceased party in such an action. 
(e) l\fay \Ve also suggest to the Court that the 
California authorities relied upon by the appellant here 
ean and should be distinguished on statutory grounds. 
rrhere the laws provide: 
• * • that the death of either party after the 
entry of the interlocutory judgment does not 
impair the power of the court to enter final 
judgment. Civil Code of California., 1949, Di-
vorce, Sec. 132. 
With all of the above in mind, we present to the 
Court the following: 
ARGUMENT 
An action for divorce is of a purely personal nature, 
in which nothing is sought to be affected ~ut the marital 
status of the parties as husband and wife. The distri-
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bution of property in such an action is merely incidental, 
and it is clearly incontestable that on the death of either 
party before the decree, the subject of the controversy 
is elinlinated and the action abates, unless a statute pro-
vides to the contrary. 1 Am. J ur., Abaten1ent and Revival, 
Sec. 110, page 83. Under our statute, 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, 
the power of the court to determine property rights is 
dependent upon the granting of a divorce to one of the 
parties. Under the particular facts in this case, did the 
court below, after the death of Fred vV. Harper, have 
such power J? We think it apparent that the court did 
not, since that personal relationship no longer existed. 
The trial court did have the power to determine and did 
in fact determine that at the time of the interlocutory 
decree, Fred W. Harper 'vas entitled to a divorce on the 
grounds of desertion from Zilpha D. Harper. The inter-
locutory decree did not dissolve the marriage. Borg v. 
Borg, 76 P.2d 218 (Cal. App. 1938); Green v. Green, 151 
P.2d 679 (Cal. App. 1944). The death of F'red W. Harper 
left Zilpha D. Harper his widow with rights as such with 
regard his estate. Hammond v. Hammond, 13 N.Y. Supp·. 
2d. 870; Diggs v. D·iggs, 196 NE 858 (Mass. 1935). The 
status of the proceedings after the entry of the inter-
locutory decree remained that of a pending action and 
the action abated upon the death of Fred W. Harper 
so that the decree could never become final, automatically 
or otherwise. 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 
442, page 366 ; see also, Sec. 179, page 241. The state no 
longer had an interest in the proceedings. McElrath v. 
McElrath, 139 NW 708 (Minn.). Could now the order of 
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t liP lowpr· <·ourt which vacated the decree be absolutely 
void T BPa~on tPlls us that the order was proper to set 
n~ide the d(·<· n~e of divorce since the marriage relation-
~ hip wa~ not tPl'tninated in that manner. But, says this 
Court, <·it.ing 1lasu~ussen v. Call, 55 Utah 597, 188 P. 275, 
tlu· <·onrt had no statutory power to set aside the decree, 
und<· r SP<·. :30-:~-7, l ~.C.A. 1953, without giving all persons 
who~t- rights ar(' involved notice and an opportunity to 
hP heard. ln that <·a~e neither party to the action for 
divon:P was der<~as<~d and they were the only parties 
proper to thf' action to divorce. Such is not here the 
ea~P: v;e are concerned \vith a situation wherein appel-
lant sought a decree of divorce from this respondent but 
the cau~e failed because death intervened. When the 
<·.ourt '"as without po\ver to grant a divorce, it was po,v-
Prless also to enter any other order in that cause, except 
to Yaca te the action, since the right of the court to deter-
lninP property rights \\·as statutorily dependent upon the 
right to decee a divorce. The interlocutory decree, it 
n1ust be re1nembered, in this case dealt only with the 
rights of the parties to the action and by no stretch of 
the imagination could any third party have intervened 
in that action. It was a personal action- for divorce only 
and the distribution of property therein attempted was 
1nerely incidental to the purpose of the action. 
The rule this Court_has now adopted is certainly not 
the rule at common law. 
_ In St(Jfnhope v. Sanhope (1886) L.R. 11 Prob. 
Div. (Eng.) 103-C.A., it was held that, where 
plaintiff in a divorce suit had obtained a decree 
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nisi and died before the expiration of the tin1e 
after 'v hich such decree could be rnade final, hi~ 
personal representative could not revive the suit 
for the purpose of having the decree 1nade abso-
lute. As against the contention that the suit 
should be allowed to be revived, and that the 
decree nisi should be per1nitted to be made abso-
lute, because 1naking it absolute would affect 
property rights, the c~urt said: "It may do so 
in many cases, as, for instance, by enabling chil-
dren to get a settlement altered. The object of 
the suit, ho,vever, is not to alter rights of prop-
erty, though it may have that effect, as by de-
priving a won1an of a legacy given to her by the 
description of the husband's widow. Such a 
result, however, is only incidental; it is not the 
object of the suit, but results incidentally from 
the putting an end to the marriage." 
:Nor is it the rule adopted by the N e'v York court. 
* * * the court In Re Crandall (1909) 196 N.Y. 
127, 89 N.E. 578, 134 Am. St. Rep. 830, 17 Ann. 
Cas. 87 4, conceding that in some jurisdictions a 
party defeated by a judgment in a divorce action, 
and thereby deprived of property rights, may 
prosecute an ap·peal after the death of the other 
party, observed that it had never been held that 
an interlocutory judgment entered- in a divorce 
action rnay be made final after the death of the 
plaintiff, because incidentally it might take away 
property rights frorn the other party, and that 
the contrary has been held. 
104 A.L.R. 661. 
Or of the State of Washington: 
It is the general rule, concurred in by re-
spondent, that an action for divorce proper, 
being purely a personal action based upon the 
personal relationship and status of marriage, 
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tertuinates with the death of either spouse, not 
only because of its personal character, but be-
<·a U~<~. the 1narriage is ipso facto dissolved by 
death. But, contends respondent where as in the 
. ' ' tnstant caHP, the interlocutory decree settled the 
propPrty rights of the parties, the action does 
not abate, in so far as the property rights are 
<;on('<~rned, but such decree 1nay be reviewed by 
thi~ court, to the <~xtent that it involves such 
rights. '(1here is rnuch authority from other jur-
isdiction~-\ to suHtain this contention of respond-
ent, but \\'e are of the opinion that, under our 
decision:-:, the interlocutory decree, in its entirety 
. ' abah~s and beeomes a nullity, upon the death of 
one of the parties, \\Thether before or after the 
interlocutory decree is entered. We stated in 
J),vyer v. Dolan, 40 \Vash. 459, 82 P. 746, 747, 1 
L.l~ .. A .. , N.S., 551, 111 Am. St. Rep. 919, 5 Ann. 
Cas. 890: "It "~in not he gainsaid that an action 
for divorce is a purely personal action. Nothing 
is sought to be affected by the marital status of 
the husband and "Tife. The distribution of prop-
erty in such an action is incidental, and it is 
clearly incontestable that upon the death of 
either party, whether before or after the decree, 
the subject of the co1~troversy is elimi1'1Jated. 93 
P. 2d 429, IJf cPherson v. IJ{ cPherson, (Wash. 
1939.) 
The facts in the instant case, reduced to the bare 
essentials are that the Harpers were married and ac-
quired real property 'vhich the title thereto they held in 
joint tenancy. Thereafter, unhappy circumstances and 
differences arising between them, the wife departed their 
their home and went to California where she chose to 
remain. The husband, after the expiration of a year, 
10 
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brought 8nit for divorre and the 'vife entered hPr \raiver 
to the proceedings thereon. The interlocutory decree 
entered but the husband died before a final decree, by 
operation of statute, becrune effective. The wife, learn-
ing of the death of her husband, then, without notice to 
the husband's heirs or adn1inistrators, petitioned the 
court to set aside the interlocutory decree. The court, 
having lost jurisdiction over one of the parties by reason 
of the Lord having assumed it, was then confronted 'vith 
a lawsuit having a defendant but no longer a plaintiff 
in an action purely personal to the parties and there being 
no statutory right of succession and no possibility for 
a substitution of parties; this certainly insofar as the 
primary object of the suit was concerned, i.e., the matter 
of divorce. Incidental only to the purpose of the suit 
was the statutory authority of the court, if he could de-
cree a final divorce, to make disposition of pToperty. 
We ask, whom could he have ordered service be h·ad 
upon~ 
Will the court give further consideration to the wife's 
consent and waiver in this case~ The wife consented to the 
husband's right to the divorce, and she chose to let him 
thus acquire title to the property rather than return and 
contest the action. From this, can we go further and 
conclude that it was her intention, should her husband 
die during the marriage relationship, to waive her right 
of survivorship in the property. We heartily contend 
that this Court can indulge in no such presumption. 
What would have been the result had no suit for divorce 
be filed~ By orderly legal process, exactly a.s the wife 
11 
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availPd herHelf of in this case (Sec. 78-41-1, U.C.A. 1953) 
:-\he would have established her right to title and owner-
:-\hip or thP property. It is admitted that Zilpha was 
Fred's widow; can we now distinguish her legal rights 
in this situation by Haying that based upon an ex parte 
intPrlo<'utory de<'ree of divorce she was the guilty party 
in a Juarriage still existing because she chose to leave 
l1t-r huHband's lHld and board. To draw such a fine dis-
tinction is to rnake possible the error of greater wrongs 
and to 1naterially weaken the status of. the marriage 
relationship. 
'Ve do not here contend that the rule adopted by 
this Court in this decision would be void of legal reason 
had the situation involved a contract, property settle-
ment agree1nent, or conveyance. In such case third par-
ties and strangers to the divorce action would have their 
legal ren1edy as against the surviving spouse without the 
infringe1nent upon the divorce action in which they could 
have no personal status. 
It is our further contention that the rule adopted 
1nakes serious inroads into the n1arketability of the title 
to real property and can only further confuse the fee 
to the expense, and harrassn1ent of owners andjor pur-
chasers within this jurisdiction. 
In remanding this case the Court said, in part: 
* * * and allow the parties to be heard upon the 
1nerits in the divorce action * * *. 
We ask for clarification. Death terminated the mar-
riage relation, and no power can dissolve a marriage 
12 
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which lias already been dissolved hy act of God. Bell 
r. Bell~ 1~1 lT.S. 173~ 21 S. Ct. 351, -l-5 L. Ed. 804. \Vho 
'Yould appear for the deceased 'f 
We respectfully sub1nit that a rehearing should be 
granted for the correction of the Inanifest errors in 
the Court's decision. 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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